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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nineteen-year-old Domingo Jesus-Martinez Diaz appeals from his judgment of
conviction for battery with the intent to commit rape, and assault with the intent to
commit rape. On appeal, Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to sever. Mr. Diaz also asserts that the district court erred
when it allowed the State to present Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence as
outlined in its Rule 404(b) notice. Additionally, Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed his sentences.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Diaz was charged by Indictment with one count of battery with the intent to
commit a serious felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-903(a) and 18-911, and one
count of assault with the intent to commit a serious felony, felony, in violation of
I.C. §§ 18-901 and 18-909.

(R., pp.26-28.)

Specifically, the Indictment charged

Mr. Diaz with battery with the intent to commit rape against Jennifer Thomas, and with
assault with the intent to commit rape against Angel Caldwell.

(See R., pp.26-27;

Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-4.) 1 Mr. Diaz entered a not guilty plea to
the charges. (R., p.42.)
Mr. Diaz later filed a Motion to Sever Charges pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
14, requesting an order severing the two counts in the Indictment. (R., pp.48-51.) The
State filed an objection to the motion to sever charges. (R., pp.58-62.) After conducting
a hearing, the district court denied the motion to sever charges. (R., pp.63-64; Tr., p.7,
L.3- p.18, L.3.)

1

The State subsequently filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.RE. 404(b), explaining
it intended to use evidence of Mr.

conduct underlying each count to show

common scheme or plan, identity, and specific intent.

(R., pp.67-70.) After hearing

argument from the parties, the district court allowed the evidence to come in. (R., p.76;
Tr., p.26, L.17 - p.35, L.8.)
The case then proceeded to a jury trial.

(R., pp.76-78, 81-87.)

Ms. Thomas

testified that she went to the 127 Club (a bar) in Meridian one evening and had some
drinks. (Tr., p.235, L.13 - p.241, L.13.) After she left the 127 Club, she decided to walk
to a friend's house nearby. (Tr., p.242, L.16

p.244, L.19.) Outside the 127 Club, a

person asked her for a cigarette, but she did not have any further communication with
that individual. (Tr., p.245, L.10 - p.246, L.16.)
Ms. Thomas testified that she then walked to the alley behind her friend's house,
and heard somebody on the gravel of the alleyway behind her.
p.250, L.15.)

(Tr., p.246, L.17 -

She asked the person what he was doing, but he did not respond.

(Tr., p.250, Ls.16-21.) She believed that the person was the person who had earlier
asked her for a cigarette.

(Tr., p.250, L.22 - p.251, L.6.)

Ms. Thomas continued

walking and again asked the person what he was doing, but he walked closer to her and
did not respond.

(Tr., p.251, Ls.7 - p.252, L.20.)

The person then poked at

Ms. Thomas' genitals twice with his fingers, and Ms. Thomas told him to get his hands
off her and ran towards her friend's house.

(Tr., p.252, L.21 - p.253, L.21.)

She

testified that the person then tackled her to the ground, pinned down her arms, and
began messing with his waistline with one hand while he straddled her.

(Tr., p.254,

L.25 - p.256, L.25.) However, she could not see exactly what the person was doing

1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 292-page PDF version of the PSI.
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with his waistline.

(Tr., p.277, Ls.13-18.)

Ms. Thomas struggled and screamed,

neighbors ran to the scene in response to the screaming, and the person hit her in the
face and ran away. (Tr., p.256, L.17

p.257, L.16.) One of the neighbors had testified

that he heard screaming and saw two people struggling in the alley, and that one of the
individuals ran away when he yelled. (Tr., p.163, L.3

p.178, L.8.)

Ms. Caldwell testified that, about a week after the incident involving Ms. Thomas,
she went to the 127 Club in the evening for about one or two hours. (Tr., p.282, L.5
p.287, L.25.)

When she left the 127 Club on foot, a person started following her.

(Tr., p.288, Ls.6-18.) Ms. Caldwell did not know the person, but had seen him before in
a shadowed doorway alcove outside the 127 Club.

(Tr., p.288, L.19 - p.292, L.18.)

She walked about four or five blocks to the Construction Zone (another bar), and the
person followed her and tried to get her to walk off the sidewalk and closer to the dark
areas near the buildings along the street. (Tr., p.296, L.5 - p.297, L.15;

see Tr., p.299,

Ls.4-7.) Ms. Caldwell testified that she was kind of rude in her responses to the person,
because she did not want to talk to him. (Tr., p.297, Ls.16-20.) The person followed
her all the way to the Construction Zone, but did not go inside with her. (Tr., p.297, L.21
- p.298, L.12.)
Ms. Caldwell testified that she stayed at the Construction Zone about two hours
and had some drinks. (Tr., p.298, L.19 - p.299, L.12.) She then began walking to her
sister's house.

(Tr., p.299, L.13 - p.303, L.19.)

Ms. Caldwell then heard someone

running behind her, and turned around to see the same person that had followed her.
(Tr., p.304, Ls.2-16.)

She asked him whether he was waiting for her, and when he

replied that he was and that they were friends, she told him they were not friends and
that it was not okay and creepy to wait for her.
3

(Tr., p.304, L.18 - p.305, L.3.)

Ms. Caldwell
follow her. (Tr.,

walking home and picked up her
Ls.1-12.)

testified

he

but the
trying

continued to
off into

the shadows with him. (Tr., p.306, Ls.13-19, p.308, Ls.3-5.) As Ms. Caldwell neared
her sister's house in a residential area, she began to run, and he ran behind her.
(Tr., p.309, L.1

p.310, L.19.) When

her around. (Tr., p.310, L.21

reached the house, he grabbed her and spun

p.312, L.24.) Ms. Caldwell shoved him and rang the

doorbell, and he ran away. (Tr., p.312, L.24

p.314, L.2.)

Detective Kevin Dixon with the Meridian Police Department testified that he had
been assigned to follow up on the battery that Ms. Thomas reported to the authorities,
and during his investigation he received some video surveillance footage that appeared
to show Ms. Thomas and the person who had followed her. (Tr., p.198, L.13 ·- p.204,
L.16.) Officer David Gomez indicated that he recognized the person. (Tr., p.204, L.17
p.205, L.11; see Tr., p.383, Ls.11-17.) Ms. Thomas confirmed that she was depicted in
the video. (Tr., p.207, L.25 - p.208, L.2.) Detective Dixon testified that, based on the
information received from Officer Gomez, he had Mr. Diaz's photo included in a photo
line-up, which was shown to Ms. Thomas. (Tr., p.217, L.12 - p.218, L.11.) Detective
Dixon testified that he and Officer Gomez then contacted Mr. Diaz and interviewed him
for about two and one-half hours. (Tr., p.221, L.24 - p.223, L.25.)
Officer Gomez testified that he believed the person from the video was Mr. Diaz,
and that he had mentored Mr. Diaz several years prior to the incidents. (Tr., p.383, L.11
- p.386, L.11.) At the interview, Officer Gomez read Mr. Diaz his Miranda rights 2 and
then explained that they were investigating a report that he might have inappropriately
touched a female in the area of the 127 Club. (Tr., p.398, L.13 - p.399, L.12.) Officer

2

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
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testified that Mr. Diaz described an incident involving Mr. Diaz and a younger
walking from the 127 Club to the Construction

and then from the

Construction Zone before the female screamed something and ran off. (Tr., p.399, L.23
p.404, L.7.)
Officer Gomez testified that, based on Mr. Diaz describing the female as younger
and coming out of the Construction Zone, at that time he did not believe that Mr. Diaz
was talking about the incident involving Ms. Thomas. (Tr., p.405, L.22 - p.406, L.2.)
When the officers asked Mr. Diaz about the incident involving a woman who went the
opposite direction, he explained that on another occasion he tried to help an older
woman home, and had put his arm around her waist to steady her because she was
falling over drunk. (Tr., p.408, L.8 - p.416, L.16.) When Detective Dixon told Mr. Diaz
that a witness had seen him doing something, he explained that they fell down when he
tried to keep her from falling over, and he may have hit her in the face and accidentally
touched her breast area when they fell down and he tried to help her up. (Tr., p.419,
L.1 - p.421, L.6.)
Officer Gomez testified that, at the conclusion of the interview, Detective Dixon
told Mr. Diaz he was being charged with battery with intent to commit a serious felony,
with regard to the incident with Ms. Thomas. (Tr., p.448, Ls.12-17.) The officers went
to Mr. Diaz's brother's house to locate a sweater that Mr. Diaz said he had been
wearing during the incident with Ms. Thomas, but chose not to enter Mr. Diaz's bedroom
to search for it because they were concerned they were not allowed to enter the room.
(Tr., p.449, L.1 - p.451, L.12.) Officer Gomez then listened to Mr. Diaz's jail telephone
calls. (Tr., p.453, Ls.13-22.) In one of the telephone calls, Mr. Diaz asked his sister if
she burned the sweater. (Tr., p.459, L.22 - p.461, L.5.)
5

Officer

testified that the officers

went to the Construction

left their contact information in case anyone wanted to report
(Tr., p.406, L.21

p.407, L.15.)

other incident

Detective Dixon testified that Ms. Caldwell

subsequently called in, and he met with her. (Tr., p.355, Ls.5 - p.356, L.6.) The police
also presented Ms. Caldwell with a photo line-up. (Tr., p.356, L.18 - p.357, L.12.) In
the photo line-ups, both Ms. Thomas and Ms. Caldwell identified a photo of Mr. Diaz as
depicting the person involved in their respective incidents. (See Exs., pp.9-16, 43-49.)3
During the trial, they both identified Mr. Diaz as the person involved in the incidents.
(See Tr., p.272, Ls.1-11, p.304, Ls.9-12.)

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Diaz guilty of battery with the
intent to commit the crime of rape, and guilty of assault with the intent to commit the
crime of rape. (R., pp.118-19.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a unified sentence of twenty
years, with ten years fixed, for the battery with the intent to commit rape charge, and a
concurrent unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed, for the assault with the
intent to commit rape charge. (Tr., p.569, L.24 - p.570, L.4; see R., p.123.) Mr. Diaz
recommended a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the battery
with the intent to commit rape charge, and a concurrent unified sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed, for the assault with the intent to commit rape charge. (R., p.123;
Tr., p.578, L.22 -

p.579, L.4.)

However, the district court went beyond the

recommendations of the parties and imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with
ten years fixed, for the battery with the intent to commit rape charge, and a consecutive

3

All citations to the Exhibits refer to the 49-page PDF version of the Exhibits.
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of fifteen
(R., pp.1

indeterminate for the assault with the intent to commit rape
1

Tr., p.603, L 11 - p.604, L 1.)

Mr. Diaz filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.132-35.)
Later, Mr. Diaz filed, pro se, a Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence,
ICR 35. (R., pp.138-41.) The district court denied the Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp.151-58.)

On appeal, Mr. Diaz does not challenge the denial of his

Rule 35 motion. 4

In the order denying the Rule 35 motion, the district court stated that Mr. Diaz
"presented no new evidence that the Court had not considered at sentencing."
(R., p.152.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the denial
of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence
absent the presentation of new information." Id.
4

7

ISSUES

1.

Did the district
abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Diaz's Motion to
because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair prejudice resulted
from the joint trial and denied him a fair trial?

2.

Did the district court err when it allowed the State to present Idaho Rule of
Evidence 404(b) evidence, because the proffered evidence was not relevant to
any applicable exception under the rule?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
twenty years, with ten years fixed, upon Mr. Diaz following his conviction for
battery with the intent to commit rape, and a consecutive sentence of fifteen
years indeterminate upon him following his conviction for assault with the intent
to commit rape?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Diaz's Motion To Sever,
Because The Facts Of His Trial Demonstrate That Unfair Prejudice Resulted From The
Joint Trial And Denied Him A Fair Trial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to sever, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair prejudice resulted
from the joint trial and denied him a fair trial. At Mr. Diaz's trial, a potential source of
prejudice-the possibility that the jury may conclude that he was guilty of one crime and
then find him guilty of the other simply because of his criminal disposition, i.e., Mr. Diaz
is a bad person-appeared.

That potential source of prejudice appeared because

evidence of either incident here would not have been admissible in a separate trial of
the other, as it was not relevant to show identity, common scheme or plan, absence of
mistake or accident, or intent.

8.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
A district court's denial of a motion to sever joinder pursuant to Idaho Criminal

Rule 14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and "that rule presumes joinder was
proper in the first place." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564-65 (2007). When a district
court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the district court reached its discretion by an exercise
of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
9

Rule 14

that:

If it appears
a defendant or the
is prejudiced by a joinder
offenses or of defendants in a complaint, indictment or information or by
such joinder for trial together, the court may order the state to elect
between counts, grant separate trials of counts, grant a severance of
defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
I.C.R. ·14.
"When reviewing an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted
from a joint trial, which denied the defendant a fair trial." State v. Egui/ior, 137 Idaho
903, 908 (Ct. App. 2002). The appellate court reviews the trial proceeding to determine
whether any of the below "potential sources of prejudice" appeared:
(a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence,
rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (b) the potential
that the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (c) the
possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime
and then find him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or her
criminal disposition, i.e., he or she is a bad person.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Abel, 140 Idaho 865, 867-68
(1983).

C.

Unfair Prejudice Resulted From The Joint Trial And Denied Mr. Diaz A Fair Trial,
Because The Possibility That The Jurv May Conclude That He Was Guilty Of
One Crime And Find Him Guilty Of The Other Simply Because Of His Criminal
Disposition Appeared
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Diaz's motion to sever

joinder, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair prejudice resulted from the
joint trial and denied him a fair trial. At the motion to sever hearing, Mr. Diaz brought up
the third potential source of prejudice: the possibility that the jury may conclude that he
was guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other simply because of his
criminal disposition, i.e., Mr. Diaz is a bad person:
10

[T]he two incidents that are alleged in
distinct.

document are separate and

And the problem with that as I think is evident in this case is the
same jury is provided information about both incidents, then there's likely
to be a synergistic effect in that the State will likely unfairly prejudice my
client by concluding, well, if it was charged twice on two separate
occasions, it really must be true or he's a bad person because he's been
charged with more than one incident.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.6-17.) The district court denied the motion to sever before the trial on the
basis of the first potential source of prejudice, determining that the jury would not
confuse and cumulate the evidence. (Tr., p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.2.) However, the third
source actually appeared during Mr. Diaz's trial.
The third source "involves the potential risk of prejudice. The risk is that the jury
may conclude that the defendant while not guilty of the specific alleged offense is a bad
person and will reach a guilty verdict on that basis." Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. When
considering the third source, the Idaho Supreme Court, like courts in some other
jurisdictions, has "engaged in an analysis of the evidence of the separate counts to
determine whether, if the counts had been tried separately, the separate evidence could
have been admitted in evidence in the different trials." Id. This essentially involves an
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) analysis. See id. at 869.
Rule 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.
I.R.E. 404(b).
When determining whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
admissible, a trial court must first "determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
11

the
trial court must

or wrong as fact" State v. Grist, 147 Idaho

(2009).

determine whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if

established, would be relevant ... to a material and disputed issue concerning the
crime charged, other than propensity." Id. (internal quotation omitted); see Abel, 104
Idaho at 869. "Such evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that
the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.

Whether evidence is relevant is a matter of law and subject to free review. Field, 144
Idaho at 569.
The trial court must then "engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine
whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.

discretion.

Id.; see Abel, 104 Idaho at 869.

This balancing is committed to the trial court's
Here, the district court found that the

probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to Mr. Diaz.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.3-8.)
Mr. Diaz asserts that the third source appeared during his trial because evidence
of either incident would not have been admissible in a separate trial of the other, as it
was not relevant under any of the applicable Rule 404(b) exceptions.

1.

Identity

Evidence of either incident was not relevant with respect to identity, because
identity was not at issue in this case. The district court, when it denied the motion to
sever, indicated that the incidents involved the "same modus operandi." (See Tr., p.15,
L.25 - p.16, L.1.) But while modus operandi evidence may be relevant to the issue of
identity if the issue of identity is disputed, see State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 336
(1990), Mr. Diaz did not place identity at issue in this case. For example, during the

12

statements, Mr. Diaz's counsel

the ju

He admits having some interaction with

that Mr. Diaz "admits that he was
two alleged victims. And he

admit that there was some physical contact between him and each of these alleged
victims.

It's undisputed that there was physical contact between these people."

(Tr., p.161, Ls.5-11.) Because identity was not at issue, evidence of either incident was
not relevant with respect to identity through showing a modus operandi.

2.

Common Scheme Or Plan

Evidence of either incident was also not relevant with respect to a common
scheme or plan. The State argued that joinder was proper because "it shows that there
was a common scheme or plan here and that

are common characteristics that go

beyond merely showing a criminal propensity." (Tr., p.13, Ls.21-24.) The district court
suggested that the incidents showed "some commonality."

(See Tr., p.15, L.25.)

However, evidence of either incident was not relevant with respect to a common
scheme or plan because it did not show a planned course of connected behavior.
The "common scheme or plan" contemplated by Rule 404(b) is "a common
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tends to establish the other." Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55. 'The
events must be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a
criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that the same person
committed all the acts." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9 (2013) (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted).

"The mere fact that the charged and uncharged conduct is

similar does not by itself establish the admissibility of prior conduct evidence to show a
common scheme or plan." Id. Rather, evidence of prior misconduct must show "that
the defendant's charged and uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the
13

inference that the prior conduct was planned as

of a course of conduct leading up

the charged offense." Id. at 1
The evidence of either incident here "is not relevant to show a common scheme
or plan because it ... does not demonstrate a planned course of connected behavior."
See id.

Ms. Thomas testified that Mr. Diaz engaged in limited verbal interaction with

her, namely that he only asked her for a cigarette. (See Tr., p.245, L.10 - p.246, L.16.)
Mr. Diaz did not verbally respond to Ms. Thomas' later questions in the alley.

(See

Tr., p.250, L.16 - p.252, L.20.) She also testified that she was not aware that Mr. Diaz
had followed her until she heard him behind her in the alley. (See Tr., p.249, L.25
p.250, L.9.) As for Mr. Diaz's conduct, Ms. Thomas testified that Mr. Diaz poked her in
the genitals before tackling her to the ground, pinning her arms down, and straddling
her while he messed with his waistband. (See Tr., p.252, L.21

p.257, L.4.)

Conversely, Ms. Caldwell testified that Mr. Diaz engaged in much more verbal
interaction with her, and that he behaved differently. Ms. Caldwell testified that they
exchanged words when he followed her from the 127 Club to the Construction Zone,
and again when he followed her from the Construction Zone. She testified that Mr. Diaz
in both instances tried to get her to go with him. (See Tr., p.297, Ls.2-15, p.306, Ls.1318.) She gave him a kind of rude response in the first instance, and told him they were
not friends and that it was not okay and creepy to wait for her in the second. (See
Tr., p.297, Ls.16-20, p.304, L.17 - p.305, L.3.) Ms. Caldwell also testified that she knew
she was being followed both times. (See Tr., p.293, L.23 - p.294, L.3, p.304, Ls.2-8.)
As for conduct, Ms. Caldwell testified that Mr. Diaz grabbed her, and she did not testify
that Mr. Diaz poked her genitals or tackled her to the ground. (See Tr., p.312, L.21 p.314, L.2.)
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Further, the

of the alleged victims are much

(observing, in the context of child sex abuse

Field, 144 Idaho
"Idaho cases affirming

the use of bad acts evidence in sexual misconduct cases focus on prior conduct that
was actual sexual abuse and that was either similar abuse or involved victims of similar
ages to those abused").

At the time of trial, Ms. Thomas was forty years old, while

Ms. Caldwell was twenty-eight.

(Tr., p.235, Ls.16-17, p.282, Ls.8-9.) Officer Gomez

testified that Mr. Diaz told the officers during the interview that the younger woman
appeared to be about twenty-two, while the older woman appeared to be about fifty.
(See Tr., p.399, L.23 - p.400, L.3, p.410, Ls.21

)

In sum, the two incidents involved different levels of verbal interaction, different
conduct, and different ages of the alleged victims.

While there are some superficial

similarities between the incidents, those similarities are "merely suggestive of
[Mr. Diaz's criminal] predisposition ... precisely the kind of character evidence barred
by Rule 404." See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. Proof of one incident would tend to establish
the other incident "only via the impermissible inference that 'if he did it once, he
probably did it again."' See id.

Thus, the evidence of either incident was not relevant

with respect to a common scheme or plan.

3.

Absence Of Mistake Or Accident

Additionally, the evidence of either incident was not relevant to absence of
mistake or accident. While the district court did not expressly find that the evidence was
relevant to absence of mistake (see Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, L.2), the State essentially
argued that it was. The State contended that Mr. Diaz had told the detectives about the
incident with Ms. Campbell, when they told him they had meant to talk about the
incident with Ms. Thomas. (Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.5.) Mr. Diaz reportedly explained
15

that he remembered the incident with Ms. Thomas and had

trying to help her

home, but when she fell down, it might have looked like he was trying to attack
when he tried to help her up.

(Tr., p.13, Ls.5-13.) According to the State, Mr. Diaz

"wasn't trying to be a Good Samaritan walking these women home when they were
under the influence of alcohol and it was dark out."

(Tr., p.13, Ls.16-19.)

But

considering the differences between the incidents examined above, "the two incidents
are too attenuated to be relevant to ... absence of mistake." See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11.
The evidence of either incident was not relevant to absence of mistake or accident.

4.

Intent

Further, the evidence of either incident was not relevant to intent.

While the

parties placed intent squarely at issue during the trial (e.g., Tr., p.504, L.4 - p.505, L5
(State's closing argument); Tr., p.517, L.5 - p.518, L.6 (defense closing argument)), the
evidence of either incident was too attenuated to be relevant to intent.
Ms. Thomas testified that she thought Mr. Diaz was going to rape her.
(Tr., p.281, Ls.5-9.) In contrast, Ms. Caldwell testified that, when she and Mr. Diaz were
walking from the Construction Zone and he was trying to coax her into the shadows, her
impression at the time was that he wanted to kiss her.

(Tr., p.325, Ls.16-23.) She

testified that when she took off in a run, "I didn't know what his intention was, like, why
he was following me still and it was making me uncomfortable; so I just wanted to get
away from him." (Tr., p.310, Ls.6-13.) She also testified that, by the time she arrived at
her sister's house, she thought that Mr. Diaz "was probably going to try to force me to
do something," without being asked by the State to specify further. (Tr., p.314, Ls.2023.) Detective Gomez testified that Mr. Diaz never admitted that he had the intent to
rape Ms. Thomas or anyone else, and additionally stated that Ms. Thomas was too old
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him.

(Tr., p.463, Ls.3-16.)

Again, because the two incidents are readily

distinguishable, evidence of the incidents was too attenuated to be relevant to intent.
Joy, 155 Idaho at 11.

Because the evidence of either incident was not relevant under any of the
Rule 404(b) exceptions, the evidence of either incident here would not have been
admissible in a separate trial of the other. Cf Abel, 104 Idaho at 869 (holding, in a case
where identity was at issue, that "the evidence of either incident when the totality of the
circumstances is considered would have been admissible in a separate trial of the
others"). Thus, the third potential source of prejudice-the possibility that the jury may
conclude that Mr. Diaz was guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other
simply because of his criminal disposition, i.e., Mr. Diaz is a bad person-appeared in
this case.
Mr. Diaz has therefore presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice
resulted from a joint trial, which denied him a fair trial. See Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908.
The district court therefore abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Diaz's motion to
sever. His judgment of conviction should be vacated, his case should be remanded to
the district court, and his charges should be severed upon remand to proceed in
separate trials.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The State To Present Idaho Rule Of Evidence
404(b) Evidence, Because The Proffered Evidence Was Not Relevant To Any
Applicable Exception Under The Rule
Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court erred when it allowed the State to present
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence as outlined in the State's Notice of Intent to
Use 1.R.E. 404(b), because the proffered evidence was not relevant to any applicable
17

under Rule 404(b). The
of

two incidents

in

Rule 404(b) notice that the

that Mr.

in a common scheme or plan,"

that the similarity of the incidents "helps to establish his identity," and "the fact that he
engaged in a physical attack, straddled [Ms. Thomas], and was touching his belt area"
showed his intent in the first incident and "also helps establish his intent" in the second
incident involving Ms. Caldwell. (R., p.69.) The district court found that the evidence
was relevant to identity, common scheme or plan, and intent. (Tr., p.33, L.3 - p.34,
L.7.) The district court also found, under Rule 403, that the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Diaz.
(Tr., p.34, Ls.12-18.)

However, as explained in Section I above and incorporated

herein, the evidence was actually not relevant to show identity, common scheme or
plan, or intent.
Whether evidence is relevant for purposes of Rule 404(b) is a matter of law and
subject to free review.

Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007).

The above relevancy

examination regarding the district court's denial of the motion to sever shows that the
evidence in the State's Rule 404(b) notice was not relevant to show identity, common
scheme or plan, or intent, and that relevancy examination is incorporated herein.
Because the proffered evidence was not relevant to any applicable Rule 404(b)
exception, the district court erred when it allowed the State to present Rule 404(b)
evidence. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52; cf. Abel, 104 Idaho at 869. Mr. Diaz's conviction
should be vacated and his case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial
at which the proffered evidence as outlined in the State's Rule 404(b) notice may not be
used to prove identity, common scheme or plan, or intent.
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111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of
Twenty Years, With Ten Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Diaz Following His Conviction For
Battery With The Intent To Commit Rape, And A Consecutive Sentence Of Fifteen
Years Indeterminate Upon Him Following His Conviction For Assault With The Intent To
Commit Rape
Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
unified sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed, for battery with the intent to
commit rape, and his consecutive sentence of fifteen years indeterminate for assault
with the intent to commit rape, because the sentences are excessive considering any
view of the facts.

The district court should have instead followed Mr. Diaz's

recommendation and imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed,
for the battery with the intent to commit rape charge, and a concurrent unified sentence
of ten years, with three years fixed, for the assault with the intent to commit
rape charge.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Diaz does not allege that his sentences exceed the

statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Diaz must
show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering
any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment
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are: (1) protection of society;

deterrence of

individual and

public generally;

(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.

An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence . . . consider[s] the
defendant's entire sentence."

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007).

The

reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement." Id.
Mr. Diaz submits that, because the district court did not give adequate
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentences imposed by the district court are
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider that the instant offenses are Mr. Diaz's first felony convictions. The
Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be accorded more
lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." E.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). While Mr. Diaz has some misdemeanor charges and convictions on his prior
record, the instant offenses are his first felony convictions.

(See PSI, pp.7-9.)

Adequate consideration of the fact that the instant offenses are Mr. Diaz's first felony
convictions should have resulted in lesser sentences.
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Diaz's youth.

Idaho's

appellate courts have recognized the youth of an offender, considered alongside the
length of the sentence imposed, as a mitigating factor in cases where the courts
reduced the excessive sentence of the offender.

State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125

(1980); State v. Justice, 152 Idaho 48 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Mr. Diaz is only nineteen years
old, and was only eighteen years old at the time of the incidents underlying the instant
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(See PSI, pp.2-5.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Diaz's youth should have

in lesser sentences.
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Diaz's possible
future amenability to treatment.

While the psychosexual evaluation completed by

Dr. Michael Johnston reported that Mr. Diaz presented as a high risk to reoffend within
the next five to ten years when compared to other sexual offenders (PSI, p.33),
Dr. Johnston's evaluation also indicates that Mr. Diaz could be amenable to treatment in
the future. While Mr. Diaz "was determined not to be amenable for sexual offender
treatment at this time," Dr. Johnston stated that if Mr. Diaz "were to become amenable
in the future, it would then be advised he participated in treatment in a structured
environment." (PSI, p.34.)
Dr. Johnston observed that "individuals can become amenable for treatment over
time." (PSI, p.63.) The dynamic risk variables Mr. Diaz presented, such as impulsivity,
poor problem-solving skills and negative emotionality, "are referred to in the
psychological literature as 'dynamic' due to their ability to change." (See PSI, pp.5456.) Thus, Dr. Johnston advised that Mr. Diaz's "attitude continued to be monitored,"
and that he participate in treatment in a structured environment if he presented as being
amenable to treatment in the future.

(PSI, p.67.)

In light of the above, Mr. Diaz's

counsel recommended "the imposition of a sentence that will afford Mr. Diaz the
opportunity to work toward change rather than a sentence that would foreclose that
possibility." (See Tr., p.577, L.25 - p.578, L.3.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Diaz's
possible future amenability to treatment should have resulted in lesser sentences.
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating
factors, the sentences imposed by the district court are excessive considering any view
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of

Thus,

district court abused

when it imposed

Mr.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Diaz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and remand his case to the district court with instruction that his
charges be severed to proceed in separate trials. Alternatively, Mr. Diaz respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court
for a new trial at which the proffered evidence as outlined in the State's Rule 404(b)
notice may not be used to prove identity, common scheme or plan, or intent.
Alternatively, Mr. Diaz respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 29 th day of September, 2014.
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